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I. INTRODUCTION
It is difficult to find any international arbitration award not based
on, or that does not at least mention, good faith. The omnipresence of
good faith does not mean (rather quite the contrary) that it is clearly
understood, that we know how to use it, or that we are able to predict
how an arbitral tribunal may apply good faith in a particular case.
Throughout my experience in arbitration I have repeatedly faced the
need to resolve claims based on good faith, and will discuss three
proceedings by way of example.

* International arbitrator; bcremades@bcremades.com.
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At the beginning of my career, I was appointed, by the
International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) International Court of
Arbitration, chairman of an arbitral tribunal, known today principally
by the name of the plaintiff: NORSOLOR.1 The case involved a
commercial conflict surrounding a sale and purchase agreement
between the French company Norsolor, and the Turkish company
Pabalk. The parties agreed to ICC arbitration without specifying
either the place of arbitration or the applicable law.2 The ICC
International Court of Arbitration selected Vienna as the place of the
arbitration, and Austrian procedural law. Absent an express
agreement between the parties, the arbitration would be arbitration at
law.3 When it came time to deliberate, the tribunal was of the opinion
that it could choose French or Turkish substantive law.4 However,
depending on whether one law or the other was applied, the
arbitration could conclude in a diametrically different manner. The
tribunal upheld as a reasonable solution the application of the general
principles of international economic law, invoking the lex mercatoria
it believed to be in force between international merchants.5
The party in disagreement, namely Norsolor, petitioned for
annulment of the award in the Austrian courts on the basis that the
tribunal was required to conduct the arbitration at law and, as a
consequence of invoking lex mercatoria, had actually decided in
equity.6 Austria’s Supreme Tribunal held that the arbitrators had
proceeded correctly by invoking the general principles of
1. Pabalk Ticaret Ltd. v. Norsolor S.A., Case No. 3131 of 1979, 9 Y.B.
Comm. Arb. 109 (ICC Int’l Ct. Arb.) (identifying the parties to the arbitration as
Pabalk and Norsolor) [hereinafter Nosorlor Award].
2. See id. (identifying “[t]he preliminary question as to the law applicable to
the agency agreement between Pabalk and Ugilor/Norsolor . . .”).
3. See, e.g., Rules of Arbitration of the International Chamber of Commerce,
art.
21.1,
available
at
http://www.iccwbo.org/uploadedFiles/Court/
Arbitration/other/2012_Arbitration%20and%20ADR%20Rules%20ENGLISH.pdf
(last visited Mar. 25, 2012) (permitting parties “to agree upon the rules of law to be
applied by the arbitral tribunal to the merits of the dispute” but providing that “[i]n
the absence of any such agreement, the arbitral tribunal shall apply the rules of law
which it determines to be appropriate”).
4. See Nosorlor Award, 9 Y.B. Comm. Arb. at 109–10 (describing the
comparative law principles behind applying Turkish law or French law).
5. Id. at 109.
6. Oberster Gerichtshof [OGH] [Supreme Court] Nov. 18, 1982, in 9 Y.B.
Int’l Arb. 159 (1984) (Austria) [hereinafter Norsolor Austria].

2012]

GOOD FAITH IN INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION

763

international law and applying lex mercatoria.7 The dispute over the
award later reappeared before the French courts when one of the
parties, namely Pabalk, petitioned for exequatur to enforce the
award.8 Norsolor argued the violation of public policy on the basis
that an arbitration, which was supposed to be conducted as
arbitration at law, had been converted into an arbitration in equity
precisely because it was decided pursuant to lex mercatoria.9 The
Court of Cassation once again affirmed the correctness of the
arbitration, on the basis that general principles of international law
form part of the sources of law.10 Therefore, by applying said
principles, the initial arbitral tribunal had likely acted correctly in its
obligation to arbitrate pursuant to international law. This first
appearance of lex mercatoria in international arbitration would give
rise to a heated controversy; Professors Berthold Goldman and Clive
Schmitthoff initiated a series of lectures and congresses, with their
opposing positions on the role of lex mercatoria in international law,
that still appears in doctrinal writing today.11
7. Norsolor Austria, 9 Y.B. Int’l Arb., at 160 (finding that that the tribunal
“applied a principle inherent in the private law systems which in no way is
contradictory to strict legal regulations of the countries here concerned” and thus,
did not “go beyond the claims submitted by the parties” by invoking the use of
equity).
8. See Cour de cassation [Cass.] [supreme court for judicial matters] 1e civ.,
Oct. 3, 1984, Bull. civ. I. No.8-9 (Fr.) [hereinafter Pabalk] (discussing the
procedural history of the case and noting that the president of the Tribunal de
grande instance de Paris granted enforcement of the award on February 5, 1980).
9. Berthold Goldman, The Applicable Law: General Principles of Law—The
Lex Mercatoria, in CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS IN INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION
120 (Julian D.M. Lew ed., 1986); see Pabalk, supra note 8 (noting that the
Tribunal de grande instance de Paris had rejected Norsolor’s argument, leading the
French company to file an appeal). But see Cour d’appel [CA] [regional court of
appeal] Paris, Nov. 15, 1982, 11 Y.B. Comm. Arb. 484, 488, note A. Jan van den
Berg (Fr.) (holding that the appeal filed by Norsolor’s to the present court would
be sustained and that the order of Tribunal de grande instance de Paris must be
reversed in light of an appeal in the Court of Appeal of Vienna that set aside part
of Pabalk’s award on January 29, 1982).
10. See Pabalk, supra note 8 (holding that the Paris Court of Appeals wrongly
quashed the award enforcement in light of governing provisions in French and
international law).
11. See Nikitas E. Hatzimihail, The Many Lives—and Faces—of Lex
Mercatoria: History as Genealogy in International Business Law, 71 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 169, 174 (2008) (describing the contributions of Clive
Schmitthoff and Berthold Goldman, who are the “founding fathers of the modern
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Years later I was appointed to an important arbitration between
Abbott Laboratories and Baxter International, Inc, with two
prominent colleagues: Japanese professor, Kazuo Iwasaki, and Texan
attorney, Gaynell Methvin.12 The seat of the arbitration was Chicago;
the applicable law was Illinois law.13 The arbitration concerned a
patent assignment agreement with strong implications in various
Middle Eastern countries. Our American colleague, whom we had
appointed chairman, considered that good faith could not be a legal
basis to decide the claims.14 Nevertheless, the majority of the panel
upheld that the international efficiency of the contract in question
required the direct application of the general principle of good faith.15
The dissenting opinion of our minority colleague, based on his
Anglo-Saxon training, did not convince the majority,16 and did not
prevail in the subsequent judicial challenge to this arbitration award.
Later, in an International Center for Settlement of Investment
Disputes (ICSID) arbitration,17 the convened panel had to analyze
good faith in the context of a jurisdictional objection of the Republic
of Peru against the Chilean company, Lucchetti.18 The arbitral
tribunal additionally studied the evidence presented on the corruption
at the time the investment was accepted and the award of the relevant
lex mercatoria”).
12. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 43a-45a, Baxter Int’l Inc. v. Abbott Labs.,
540 U.S. 963 (2003) (No. 03-59) (describing the arbitration panel convened
pursuant to the parties Dispute Resolution Agreement, selected by the Center for
Public Resources (CPR) for Non-Administered Arbitration of International
Disputes).
13. Id. at 44a (noting that the CPR Arbitral Panel could apply either the law of
Japan or Illinois).
14. See Abbott Labs. v. Baxter Int’l Inc., 315 F.3d 829, 834 (7th Cir. 2003)
(Cudahy, J., dissenting).
15. See Abbott Labs. v. Baxter Int’l Inc., Nos. 01 C 4809, C 4839, 2002 WL
467147, at *6 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 26, 2002), aff’d, 315 F.3d 829 (7th Cir. 2003) (stating
that “[t]he arbitrators found that the obligation of good faith under Illinois law
establishes an independent cause of action under the Baxter/Maruishi Agreement”
and noting that “arbitrators concluded it would be a breach of the duty of good
faith for Baxter to ‘deprive its own sublicensee of the fruits of its contract.’”).
16. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 12, at 69a-70a.
17. Empresas Lucchetti S.A. v. Republic of Peru, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/4,
Award, (Feb. 7, 2005), 19 ICSID Rev. 359 (2004) (noting that the claimants
submitted a request for arbitration to ICSID based on the Bilateral Investment
Treaty between Peru and Chile).
18. Id. at 362.
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licenses against environmental regulations.19 Consequently, the
tribunal held that because the Bilateral Investment Treaty between
Peru and Chile was not in force at the time Lucchetti first invested,20
and despite the alleged corruption in obtaining favorable judgments
to continue with the investment (in its most serious form because this
case entailed corruption by the judiciary), the international
arbitration could not proceed on the merits.21 Previously, the
arbitration award of Lanco International Inc., in its litigation with the
Republic of Argentina, had for some time determined the nature of
arbitration agreements in investment arbitration.22 The arbitration
agreements would arise from the public offering made by a state in
the investment protection treaty23 with respect to the investors of the
other contracting country, with the investor’s individual acceptance
occurring at the time of presenting the request for arbitration.24
Nevertheless, the public offering made by the State must be accepted
in good faith by the investor at the time of initiating the arbitration.25
Thus, the Lucchetti tribunal deprived the judicial decisions that
authorized the investment in Peru, of the effect of res judicata.26
These three arbitration experiences, among many others, have
resulted in the acceptance of the principle of good faith in
international arbitration. Nevertheless, it is not clear what the
concept of good faith actually means. Some view this principle with
religious connotations: in Rome, the goddess Fides was entrusted by
Jupiter with justice in contracts. In medieval times, good faith was
19. Id. at 364-67.
20. Id. at 388.
21. Id. (finding that the tribunal lacked “jurisdiction to hear the merits of the
present claim”).
22. Lanco Int’l v. The Argentine Republic, ICSID Case no. ARB/97/6,
Jurisdiction of the Arbitral Tribunal (Dec. 8, 1998), 40 I.L.M. 457 (2001).
23. See, e.g., id. ¶ 8 (describing the Treaty Concerning the Reciprocal
Encouragement of Investment signed by the United States and Argentina).
24. See generally id. ¶ 31 (explaining that the U.S.-Argentina treaty provided
the investor with the ability to select a dispute settlement method and that “once
the investor has expressed its consent in choosing ICSID arbitration, the only
means of dispute settlement available is ICSID arbitration”).
25. Id. ¶ 40.
26. Empresas Lucchetti S.A. v. Republic of Peru, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/4,
Award (Feb. 7, 2005), 19 ICSID Rev. 359, 386 (2004) (finding that because the
original dispute over the judgments allowing the investment never ended, res
judicata under Peruvian law could not prevail).
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connected to Christian morality. The French doctrine of the 19th and
20th centuries introduced a key element of altruism or loyalty.
German doctrine applies paragraph 242 BGB with Kantian
references to the categorical imperative. In the Anglo-Saxon sphere,
doctrine and jurisprudence demonstrate a radical rejection of good
faith that they hold to be “abhorrent” with the adversarial spirit,
which must govern in the world of contracts. Naturally, this rejection
has been mitigated in the legal system of the United States, where
there is no shortage of voices advocating good faith as the great
recent discovery in U.S. law.27 In other legal systems, good faith is
questioned as are, in general, any standards which may lead to
arbitrariness by judicial or arbitral decision-makers. Among
ourselves, the categorical voice of Peruvian maestro Fernando de
Trazegnies is radical in this respect. He tells us that good faith is the
terrorist of law,28 allowing for arbitrariness in judicial decisionmaking.29
It is therefore of enormous interest to focus our attention on good
faith in international arbitration. At the onset of a proceeding, one of
the most delicate and fundamental tasks is the selection of the
panel’s arbitrators and, especially, of its chairman. For those who set
the parties’ strategy when a case arises in which good faith may play
a material role, the major question to ask is whether or not the legal
culture and training of the potential arbitrators might condition their
ultimate decision. Counsel must be aware of the various angles that
can be given to good faith in legal argument as well as in the
arbitrators’ decision-making process.
Undoubtedly, the globalization of the economy and the
27. See, e.g., Chunlin Leonard, A Legal Chameleon: An Examination of the
Doctrine of Good Faith in Chinese and American Contract Law, 25 CONN. J. INT’L
L. 305, 311-12 (2010) (asserting that “[t]he doctrine of good faith, with regard to
contractual relations, has a relatively recent history in the US” and that it “received
a boost when the UCC officially adopted the concept in the 1950s”)).
28. See Fernando De Trazegnies Granda, Desacralizando la buena fe en el
derecho [Desecrating the Good Faith in Law], in 2 TRATADO DE LA BUENA FE EN
EL DERECHO 19, 43, 45 (Marcos M. Córdoba ed., 2004) (“la equidad y la buena fe
— con la vaguedad implícita a la que se ha hecho referencia — se convierten aquí
en los agentes terroristas de la seguridad contractual.”).
29. See id. at 46 (“las consideraciones aducidas por los defensores de la ‘buena
fe’ objetiva son simplemente los motivos personales”).
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extraordinary professionalization of arbitrators minimize the
importance in practice of issues that might generate heated
confrontation in the field. Gustave Flaubert was right when he said
that “truth lies as much in shading as it does in vivid tones.”30
The analysis of good faith in international arbitration requires
consideration of the general principles of law; good faith in so-called
classical contract law, starting from the XIX century; good faith in
international law; good faith in international arbitration; and the
requirements for arbitrating in good faith.

II. GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF LAW
Article 1, paragraph 1 of the Spanish Civil Code starts out by
stating that “[t]he sources of the Spanish legal order are statutes,
custom and general legal principles.” 31 Article 1, paragraph 4,
elaborates that: “[g]eneral legal principles shall apply in the absence
of applicable statute or custom, without prejudice to the fact that
they contribute to shape the legal system.”32 From this example, it
may be inferred that in the legal order of a state, general principles of
law appear as true, authentic sources, together with laws and custom.
The nature of good faith as a binding guide for the legal order is
emphasized, so that both laws and custom must be construed in light
of general principles of law. In addition, it is clear that general
principles of law are the basis for claims: they will apply in the
absence of laws or custom. The parties can thus invoke the general
principles of law as a direct basis for claims.33
It is in this context in which good faith in the legal order must be
analyzed. The Dictionary of the Spanish Language of the Spanish
30. See GUSTAVE FLAUBERT, CORRESPONDENCE 1846, at 417 (1927) (“[L]a
verité est tout autant dans les demi-teîntes que dans les tons tranchés.”).
31. CÓDIGO CIVIL [C.C.] [CIVIL CODE] art. 1.1 (Spain).
32. Id. art. 1.4.
33. See Emmanuel Gaillard, La Distinction des Principes Généraux du Droit et
des Usages du Commerce International [Distinction of the General Principles of
Law and the Uses of International Trade], in ETUDES OFFERTES A PIERRE BELLET
201, 216 (1991) (“L’auteur de ces lignes espère avoir montré la nécessité de
réserver le terme « usages du commerce international » aux pratiques
habituellement suivies dans une branche d’activité déterminée et de ne reconnaître
à cette notion qu’un rôle purement supplétif, à la différence des principes généraux
du droit qui constituent de véritables règles transnationales.”).
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Royal Academy defines good faith” (fe- buena) as: “rectitude, honor;
criterion of conduct to which the honest behavior of subjects of the
law must adapt; in bilateral relations, behavior appropriate to the
expectations of the other party.” 34 Good faith appears as conduct
based on trust. Francis Fukuyama was right by pointing out that
social relations, including especially the law, must be based on
trust.35 Good faith is required by law in all human conduct.36
Nevertheless, good faith as conduct must have a normative basis
in order to become a general principle of law. Good faith appears
frequently in numerous articles of the Spanish Civil Code applying in
various contractual contexts. Luis Díez Picazo rightly said that “[t]he
concept of good faith is one of the most difficult to grasp within civil
law, and is one of the legal concepts that has given rise to the longest
and most passionate controversy.”37
Specific manifestations of good faith as a general principle of law
might be the abuse of law through an antisocial exercise of a right,
the doctrine of estoppel or good faith in the participation of any
judicial proceeding. Article 7 of the Spanish Civil Code establishes
that
[r]ights must be exercised in accordance with the requirements of good
faith. The law does not support abuse of rights or the antisocial exercise
thereof. Any act or omission which, as a result of the author’s intention,
its purpose, or the circumstances in which it is performed manifestly
exceeds the normal limits to exercise a right, with damage to a third party,
shall give rise to the corresponding compensation and to the adoption of
judicial or administrative measures preventing persistence in such

34. Fe Definition, Rae.es, http://buscon.rae.es/draeI/SrvltObtenerHtml?ID
LEMA=83119&NEDIC=Si#mala_fe (last visited Apr. 7, 2012).
35. See FRANCIS FUKUYAMA, TRUST: THE SOCIAL VIRTUES AND THE CREATION
OF PROSPERITY 26 (1995) (“Trust is the expectation that arises within a community
of regular, honest, and cooperative behavior, based on commonly shared norms. . .
.”).
36. See M. TULLI CICERONIS, DE OFFICIIS 22 (1994) (Fundamentum autem est
iustitiae fides, id est dictorum conv entorumque constantia et veritas. Ex quo,
quamquam hoc videbitur fortasse cuipiam durius, tamen audeamus imitari Stoicos,
qui studiose exquirunt unde verba sint ducta, credamusque, quia fiat quod dictum
est, appellatam fidem.”).
37. LUIS DÍEZ-PICAZO PONCE DE LEÓN, LA DOCTRINA DE LOS PROPIOS ACTOS
[English Translation] 134–35 (1963).
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abuse.38

The prohibition of the abuse of a right or antisocial exercise
thereof is a clear normative consequence of good faith as a general
principle of law.
The doctrine of estoppel is another normative consequence of
good faith as a general principle of law. As Díez Picazo points out
good faith implies “a duty of consistent conduct, consisting in the
need to observe in the future, the conduct that prior acts made
foreseeable.”39 The doctrine of estoppel, having its roots principally
in jurisprudence based on good faith, constitutes a limit on subjective
rights. It does not extinguish the right, but rather only limits its
exercise. It postulates the inability to exercise the right.
Consequently, in some countries, any participation in judicial or
arbitral proceeding must be conducted in good faith. The Spanish
Civil Procedure Act affirms this view40 and is supported by the
country’s Law on the Judiciary: “[i]n all types of proceedings the
rules of good faith will be observed. 2. Evidence directly or
indirectly obtained in violation of fundamental rights or liberties will
lack effect. Courts and tribunals will reject with reason all requests,
applications and objections made in manifest abuse of rights or that
entail legal or procedural fraud.”41 On the subject of arbitration,
reference can also be made to the Peruvian Arbitration Act of 2008,
article 38 of which states that “the parties are required to respect the
principle of good faith in all of their acts and participations in the
course of arbitral proceedings and to cooperate with the arbitral
tribunal in the development of the arbitration.”42
The general principles of law and, inter alia, good faith as a
principle of principles, are enshrined in various legal systems.43
38. CÓDIGO CIVIL [C.C.] [CIVIL CODE] art. 7 (Spain).
39. DÍEZ-PICAZO, supra note 37, at 245 (“[I]mplica un deber de coherencia del
comportamiento, que consiste en la necesidad de observar en el futuro, la conducta
que los actos anteriores hacían [prever].”).
40. Civil Procedure Act art. 247.1 (B.O.E. 2000, 1) (Spain) (“The parties
involved in any kind of proceedings in keeping with the rules of good faith.”).
41. LEY ORGÁNICA DEL PODER JUDICIAL 6/1985 [L.O.P.J.], B.O.E. n. 157, art.
11, ¶¶ 1-2, July 2, 1985 (Spain).
42. Ley de Arbitraje art. 38 (D.O. 2008, 1071) (Peru).
43. Pierre Mayer, Le principe de bonne fois devant les arbitres du commerce

770

AM. U. INT’L L. REV.

[27:4

Hence, in 1987 René David spoke of the nationalization of private
international law,44 though the French maestro never knew economic
globalization or the establishment of a universal economic legal
order. International commercial arbitration began as a subject then
referred to as comparative law. Arbitral jurisprudence and the
activity of arbitrators have created an international economic law,
distinct from the legal orders regulating persons or companies in
arbitration. It is even possible to question the applicability of national
conflict of laws rules when the parties have expressed their desire to
submit to a decision pursuant to general principles of international
law. Treaties regulating international arbitration allow arbitrators to
apply the conflict rules they deem most appropriate. For example, the
Spanish Arbitration Act holds that in an international arbitration “if
the parties do not indicate the applicable rules of law, the arbitrators
will apply those they deem appropriate.”45

III. GOOD FAITH IN CLASSICAL CONTRACT LAW
International arbitration has evolved beyond the boundaries of
national laws. Nevertheless, arbitrators are the protagonists of
international arbitration and, therefore, it is appropriate to ask
whether the legal culture they come from and the training they have
received, conditions their decisive mental process at the time of
applying the general principle of good faith. Hence, it is interesting
to analyze the acceptance of good faith in the legal systems we might
consider to be of essential reference: French, German, and AngloSaxon law. What has come to be called “classical contract law”
dates from the 19th century and the beginning of the 20th century,
revolving around the major codification movements. The different
schools train their respective national jurists at times pursuant to
radically different criteria. A brief analysis is indispensable in
responding to the question of the influence of the arbitrator’s own
legal culture on the decisions the arbitrator is required to make.

international, Etudes de droit international en honneur de Pierre Lalive, 1993, p.
554: “la bonne fois apparaît ainsi comme le principe des principes.”
44. RENE DAVID, LE DROIT DU COMMERCE INTERNATIONAL [THE LAW OF
INTERNATIONAL TRADE] 10 (André Tunc ed., 1987).
45. Ley de Arbitraje art. 34 (B.O.E. 2003, 60/2003) (Spain).
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A. THE FRENCH CIVIL CODE
The French Civil Code, in force since the year 1804, establishes
that contracts “must be performed in good faith.”46 For the French
legislator, good faith applies initially in the performance of contracts.
French jurists preparing the code looked to the Roman tradition, in
which the goddess Fides was, above all, a religious notion,47 to
whom the divine protection of contracts was attributed.
Subsequently, good faith was integrated within the Christian faith
and followed by Jean Domat and Robert-Joseph Pothier, founders of
the French Civil Code.48
Good faith, undoubtedly, was for them a notion of religious
inspiration. For Domat, good faith constituted a direct consequence
of the mutual love among mankind—a divine mandate. His Christian
influence as an active member of the Hansenist community is
reflected in his legal works. Subsequently, Pothier, the true successor
of Domat’s work, also sustained that good faith is closely tied to the
religious inspiration of mutual love among mankind, thus mandating
the need to consider third-party interests.
The entry into force of the French Civil Code was accompanied by
an ideological evolution of good faith.49 There was not so much
emphasis on the religious connection but rather on the need to
consider what came to be classified as altruism. André Gide would
come to affirm that “good faith is an essential lay virtue, which
simply replaces faith.”50 Good faith thus becomes a general
46. CODE CIVIL [C. CIV.] art. 1134 (Fr.).
47. Fides (Roman goddess), Britannica.com, http://www.britannica.com/EB
checked/topic/206119/Fides (last visited Apr. 7, 2012).
48. See generally Romain Loir, Les fondements de l’exigence de bonne foi
en droit français des contrats [The Foundations of the Requirement of Good Faith
in French Contract Law] 20–49 (2002) (unpublished doctoral thesis, l'Université
du Droit et de la Santé de Lille), available at http://edoctorale74
.univ-lille2.fr/fileadmin/master_recherche/T_l_chargement/memoires/contrats/loirr
02.pdf.
49. Yves Derains & Stephan Adell, Los nuevos principios de lealtad, celeridad
y confidencialidad del Código de Procedimiento Civil Francés [The New
Principles of Loyalty, Speed and Confidentiality of the French Code of Civil
Procedure], in SPAIN ARB. REV., no. 11, 2011, at 25, 27 (2011) (“La lealtad en
derecho francés es uno de los deberes asociados a la exigencia de buena fe que se
impone en la ejecución de los contratos. . . .”).
50. André Gide, Dec. 13, 1927 Journal, in JOURNAL, Volume II (1925-1950)
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requirement imposed on all individuals—whether or not bound by a
contract. Hence, every contract must be interpreted in light of its
social relevance, whether or not this was taken into consideration by
the parties upon entering into the contract.

B. GERMAN LAW
The German Civil Code (BGG), entered into force in the year
1900, establishes the need to act with good faith.51 Paragraph 242 of
the BGB, due to its subsequent importance in jurisprudence, has been
classified as the “king” of the German Civil Code.52
German scholars were quite divided throughout the 19th century as
to whether or not it was appropriate to codify civil legislation. Wellknown is the controversy begun by Anton Friedrich Justus Thibaut in
his book on the need to codify law in Germany53 and the violent
reaction by Friedrich Carl von Savigny, for whom the law must
develop slowly and as a result of the study of custom and of the
traditions of each State.54 In the Germany of the 19th century, the idea
of the well-cultured man triumphed; the struggle between the socalled jurisprudence of concepts and jurisprudence of interests
reflects the intense cultural debate of German jurists of that era.55
(Gallimard ed., 1997) at 62 (“[L]a bonne foi est une vertu essentiellement laïque,
qui remplace la foi tout court.”).
51. BÜRGERLICHES GESETZBUCH [BGB] [CIVIL CODE], Aug. 18, 1896,
REICHSGETZBLATT [RGBL.] 42, as amended, art. 242 (Ger.) (noting that in
performing good faith, customary practices are to be considered).
52. Ole Lando, Is Good Faith an Over-Arching General Clause in the
Principles of European Contract Law?, in LIBER AMICORUM GUIDO ALPA:
PRIVATE LAW BEYOND THE NATIONAL SYSTEMS 601, 604 (Mads Andenas et al.
eds., 2007).
53. See ANTON FRIEDRICH JUSTUS THIBAUT, UEBER DIE NOTHWENDIGKEIT
ሷ GERLICHEN RECHTS FUR
ሷ DEUTSCHLAND (J.C.B. Mohr ed.,
EINES ALLGEMEINEN BUR
1840).
54. See Aniceto Masferrer, Defense of the Common Law Against Postbellum
American Codification: Reasonable and Fallacious Argumentation, 50 AM. J.
LEGAL HIST. 355, 418 (2008–2010) (describing the influence of Savigny’s theory
against codification and arguing that “it is hard to believe that Savigny would have
done what he did without Thibaut and his heated confrontation with him”).
55. See SIR BASIL MARKESINIS ET AL., THE GERMAN LAW OF CONTRACT: A
COMPARATIVE TREATISE 12 (2d ed. 2006) (describing the impact of German
theorists in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries on the development and
teaching of the law).
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The concept of good faith crystallized in the BGB breaks with the
past and is founded on the “categorical imperative” of Immanuel
Kant.56 Good faith is connected to that universal law which arises
from the metaphysics of customs. With an indubitable influence of
Rousseau, Kantian philosophy construes liberty, not by the fact of
being removed from any law, but rather by the submission to the law
itself that results from the rightful conscience of each being.57
Therefore, the contracting party under German law knows that he
must negotiate in good faith. He assumes, if he has not done so, an
eventual culpa in contrahendo, or fault at the time of contracting.
Paragraph 242 of the BGB has played an extremely important role
in German jurisprudence. The judge or, as the case may be, the
arbitrator, acts (a) in exercising his function, to apply the law and, as
appropriate, to specify the consequences of what is established by
law; (b) to limit the exercise of contractual rights where there may be
an excess in the abusive exercise of the right; and (c) even contra
legem, to impose himself in the form of a true ethical-legal rupture of
the legal right. Hence, the German trier of fact has learned how to
use the letter of paragraph 242 in a radically different manner
depending on the ethical-political demands of the time.58
The German jurist has introduced, together with the principal
obligations of any contract, so-called accessory obligations. These
include, for example, the duty of vigilance, the obligation of
clarification to the other party, loyalty, the obligation to cooperate,

56. Lando, supra note 52, at 602.
57. Robert Johnson, Kant’s Moral Philosophy, STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
PHILOSOPHY (Apr. 6, 2008), http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/kant-moral/.
58. See Werner F. Ebke & Bettina M. Steinhauer, The Doctrine of Good Faith
in German Contract Law, in GOOD FAITH AND FAULT IN CONTRACT LAW 171, 190
(Jack Beatson & Daniel Friedmann eds., 1995) (“German courts are moving in the
direction of common-law jurisdictions, where judges openly admit that they are
making-law. . . . The doctrine of good faith is a particularly tempting instrument
for interstitial law making.”); cf. Simon Whittaker & Reinhard Zimmerman, Good
Faith in European Contract Law: Surveying the Legal Landscape, in GOOD FAITH
IN EUROPEAN CONTRACT LAW 7, 22 (Reinhard Zimmerman & Simon Whittaker
eds., 2000) (“Today we have still not managed to find a magic formula which
defines the line to be drawn between what may properly be classified as
‘interpretation’ and what is usually referred to as ‘judicial development’ of the
law.”).
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and the obligation to inform.59

C. ANGLO-SAXON LAW
Despite the fact that in the XVIII century Lord Mansfield, the
father of English commercial law, believed that good faith was the
principle by which all contracts and negotiations should be
governed,60 it is true that present-day English law has a strong
tendency to interpret documents literally.61 That magical power has
been described by D’Amato as follows: “in the early days of
contract, if the paper on which it had been written was itself lost or
destroyed, the contract was regarded as dissolved.”62 Lord Ackner
clearly expressed the English jurist’s position on good faith in
Walford v. Miles:
The concept of a duty to carry on negotiations in good faith is inherently
repugnant to the adversarial position of the parties when involved in
negotiations. Each party to the negotiations is entitled to pursue his (or
her) own interest, so long as he avoids making misrepresentations. . . . A
duty to negotiate in good faith is as unworkable in practice as it is
inherently inconsistent with the position of a negotiating party.63

Lord Steyn, also supporting this notion, indicated that there was no
need in English Law to introduce a general duty of good faith
inasmuch as the tribunals respect “the reasonable expectations of the
parties” according to pragmatic traditions of English Law.64

59. See Ebke & Steinhauer, supra note 58, at 177 (describing the development
of “‘secondary’ or ‘auxiliary’ obligations”).
60. See Carter v. Boehm, [1766] 97 Eng. Rep. 1162, 1164 (K.B.) (“The
governing principle is applicable to all contracts and dealings.”).
61. See Jori Munukka, Harmonisation of Contract Law: In Search of a Solution
to the Good Faith Problem, 48 SCANDINAVIAN STUDIES IN LAW 229, 233 (Peter
Wahlgren ed., 2005) (observing that “the majority view is that good faith is not a
generally applicable principle in English contract law”).
62. See Anthony D’Amato, Good Faith, in 2 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC
INTERNATIONAL LAW 599, 600 (Rudolf Bernhardt ed., 1995) (“Thus if one party
performed its obligation under a written contract and then lost (or was forcibly
deprived of) the paper upon which the contract was written, the other party was
entirely relieved of its reciprocal obligation.”).
63. Walford v. Miles, [1992] 2 A.C. 128 (H.L.) 138 (U.K.).
64. Lord Steyn, Contract Law: Fulfilling the Reasonable Expectations of
Honest Men, 113 LAW Q. REV. 433, 439 (1997).
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This indeed explains the violent reaction of English jurists to the
controversy arising from lex mercatoria in international arbitration
on the occasion of the judgment cited in the Norsolor case. Lord
Mustill led the radical criticism against the potential use of lex
mercatoria by international arbitrators.65 Good faith, the general
principles of law or, generally, lex mercatoria, were contrary to the
fundamental bases of English law: sacramental respect of the literal
text of the contract. The integration of the United Kingdom into the
European Community has introduced legislation in England allowing
the radical positions that were upheld decades ago to be questioned.
Consumer legislation,66 the ratification of the United Nations (U.N.)
Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods,67 or the
English participation in the principles of European law are clear
manifestations of a potential evolution in this respect.68
In other common law countries, admitting good faith as a general
principle of law is a recent development and of enormous
importance. In the United States, section 1-304 of the Uniform
Commercial Code indicates that “[e]very contract or duty within [the
Uniform Commercial Code] imposes an obligation of good faith in
its performance and enforcement.” 69 Section 205 of the Restatement
(Second) of Contracts established in 1981 that “[e]very contract
65. See generally Michael Mustill, The New Lex Mercatoria, in LIBER
AMICORUM FOR THE RT. HON. LORD WILBERFORCE 149 (Maarten Bos & Ian
Brownlie eds., 1987).
66. See Jean Calais-Auloy, Le Devoir de se Comporter de Bonne Foi Dans Les
Contrats de Consommation [Duty to act in good faith in consumer contracts], in
GENERAL CLAUSES AND STANDARDS IN EUROPEAN CONTRACT LAW 189–95
(Stefan Grundmann & Denis Mazeaud eds., 2006).
67. U.N. Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, art. 7(1),
Apr. 11, 1980, 1489 U.N.T.S. 3; see also E. Allan Farnsworth, Duties of Good
Faith and Fair Dealing under the UNIDROIT Principles, Relevant Conventions
and National Laws, 3 TUL. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 47, 54-57 (1995).
68. See ELISABETH PEDEN, GOOD FAITH IN THE PERFORMANCE OF CONTRACTS
11 (2003) (noting that the duty of good faith “is slowly being introduced into
England through European and international initiatives”); Hugh Beale, General
Clauses and Specific Rules in the Principles of European Contract Law: The Good
Faith Clause, in GENERAL CLAUSES AND STANDARDS IN EUROPEAN CONTRACT
LAW 205, 218 (Stefan Grundmann & Denis Mazeaud eds., 2006) (criticizing
inconsistent usage of the Principles of European Contract Law (PECL) and
remarking that “Article 1:102 needs to be revised to make clear that good faith and
fair dealing is not an overarching control mechanism.”).
69. U.C.C. § 1-304 (1981).
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imposes upon each party a duty of good faith and fair dealing in its
performance and its enforcement.”70 According to the comments in
this section, the conduct must also adjust to the “common purpose of
the parties and, congruently to the justified expectations of the other
party.”71 Hence, for E. Allan Farnsworth, the spread of the concept of
good faith is in part due to its recognition in the United States, and is
now a pillar of Anglo-Saxon law of contracts.72 Furthermore,
paragraph 31 of arbitral award in Abbott Laboratories v. Baxter
International indicated that [t]he tribunal found “that the obligation
of good faith under Illinois Law establishes an independent cause of
action under the . . . Agreement. . . . [G]ood faith is not only an aid in
the interpretation of the Agreements, but is a distinct legal basis for
contractual commitments.”73 Finally, in Australia, Anthony Mason
has had no problem commenting that “[b]elow the level of the High
Court, reflecting developments in other jurisdictions, our courts
appear to accept that a duty of good faith in contract performance
may be implied,”74 although whether the High Court agrees still
remains unanswered.75

D. CONSEQUENCES OF THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN CONTINENTAL
LAW AND ANGLO-SAXON LAW
In practice, a confrontation between Continental and Anglo-Saxon
ideas can be avoided. Particularly, an experienced arbitrator in a
globalized economy knows how to interpret and apply legal concepts
from other systems although they may seem unusual to him.
Nevertheless, it is of interest to contrast the most radical positions of
the Continental and the Anglo-Saxon jurists, since in practice we
frequently witness the psychological reaction of the arbitrator, as
explained in his decision. Today, with the importance international
arbitration has in Latin American countries, we are seeing
arbitrations where Latin American law is applied without any of the
arbitrators being familiar with the basic principles of Continental
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 205 (1981).
Id. at comments & Illustrations a.
See Farnsworth, supra note 67, at 51-54 (1995).
Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 12, at 65a.
See Hon. Sir Anthony Mason, Foreword to ELISABETH PEDEN, GOOD
FAITH IN THE PERFORMANCE OF CONTRACTS, at v (2003).
75. Id.
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Law since often they do not even understand the local language. To
what extent are foreign trained arbitrators they able to make
decisions based on translations or explanations of the parties of legal
concepts, sometimes so closely tied especially with Spanish-speaking
lawyers, such as the general principle of good faith?76
1. Good Faith and Pre-Contractual Liability
The Continental jurist has a clear idea that an eventual culpa in
contrahendo will exist if a party breaks off negotiations without just
cause. Pre-contractual liability also exists when the duty of
confidentiality is breached, even if not expressly agreed to, and the
other party incurs damages. If one party to the negotiations learns of
any impediment that would make the contract void or voidable, and
does not inform the other party, the former may be subject to pay
damages suffered (negative interest) or the profits the innocent party
is unable to recoup from the contract (positive interest).
On the contrary, common law takes the point of view that each
party has his own capabilities and does not owe a fiduciary duty to
the other. The only limit of such party in this negotiation consists of
not committing fraud or deceit.77
2. Good Faith in Contract Interpretation
Contracts must be performed in good faith. This requires that
parties’ representations be construed as coming from reasonable
people. Hence, different rules of the civil codes admit a subjective
and objective interpretation: subjective to discover the true intent of
the contracting parties, and objective to obtain the most reasonable
and equitable interpretation.

76. See generally Jack Beatson & Daniel Friedmann, From ‘Classical’ to
Modern Contract Law, in GOOD FAITH AND FAULT IN CONTRACT LAW 4 (Jack
Beatson & Daniel Friedmann eds., 1995) (“English contract lawyers have shown a
greater willingness to export ideas than to import them.”).
77. See ROBERT A. HILLMAN, PRINCIPLES OF CONTRACT LAW 262 (2d ed.
2009) (“Judge Posner found a good faith obligation to cooperate, which he
characterized as ‘halfway between a fiduciary duty … and the duty merely to
refrain from active fraud”); see also Jean-François Roman, Théorie critique du
principe général de bonne foi en droite privé. Des atteintes à la bonne foi, en
général, et de la fraude, en particulier, (Fraus omnia corrumpit) (2000).
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On the other hand, English law does not refer to good faith.78
Contract interpretation is a process in which tribunals attribute to the
language of the parties the true meaning of the words used.79 The
approach is objective, seeking out the parties’ intent in the contract
itself, without the subjective intent of the parties having any decisive
value.80
3. Good Faith in Contract Performance
For the Continental jurist, the contract must be performed in good
faith. For such purpose, two criteria are established: the basic
criterion of a ‘good head of a family’ or due diligence, or a more
demanding criterion in the case of a professional relationship.
Under English law, the parties can exercise their contractual rights
and plaintiffs have standing to request what they deem appropriate,
provided that they have not breached their own contractual
obligations. Anglo-Saxon law starts from the premise that contract
liability is absolute and, therefore, if one party cannot perform then,
the payment of damages always follows.81
At conferences, we sometimes tend to present the different points
of view by exaggerating the differences between Continental and
Anglo-Saxon Law. What is truly important is to know whether or
not, when we appoint an arbitrator from one cultural background or
the other, we can predict any tendency in that arbitrator’s decision.
If, for example, the case involves pre-contractual liability, a question
78. But cf. John Klein, Good Faith in International Transactions, 15
LIVERPOOL L. REV. 115, 117–18 (1993) (discussing the limited role good faith has
in English law due in part to separate courts of law and equity).
79. Cf. Elena Christine Zaccaria, The Dilemma of Good Faith in International
Commercial Trade, 1 MACQUARIE J. BUS. L. 101, 103 (2004) (noting that English
law takes a different “route” to reach results arrived at in civil law, without
recurring to good faith).
80. See MARVIN A. CHIRELSTEIN, CONCEPTS AND CASE ANALYSIS IN THE LAW
OF CONTRACTS 1 (2006) (“[L]egal rules in some way provide assurance that the
agreement will be honored. Contract law is supposed to implement that
expectation.”).
81. See Beatson & Friedmann, supra note 76, at 425; cf. OMRI BEN-SHAHAR &
ARIEL PORAT, FAULT IN AMERICAN CONTRACT LAW (Omri Ben-Shahar & Ariel
Porat eds., 2010). See generally MICHAEL E. SCHNEIDER & JOACHIM KNOLL,
PERFORMANCE AS A REMEDY: NON-MONETARY RELIEF IN INTERNATIONAL
ARBITRATION (Michael E. Schneider & Joachim Knoll eds., 2011).
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is whether an Anglo-Saxon arbitrator will decide differently from an
arbitrator trained on the Continent.
This practice is reflected by Philippe Kahn who concludes that
“the arbiters must thus engage in the delicate work of interpretation,
which closely resembles a creative work.”82 Farnsworth, a
distinguished university professor from the Anglo-Saxon tradition,
concludes that “[c]ivil law lawyers regard the concepts of good faith
and fair dealing as essential components of their legal systems. On
the other hand, common law lawyers, generally regard these
concepts as fairly recent innovations to their legal systems.”83
Among the Anglo-Saxon law systems, only the United States has a
relatively developed doctrine of good faith and of faithful conduct in
relation to the execution of contracts. I would also like to add to this
idea the opinion of Lord Steyn on the subject of contracts by
referring to performance that imposes good faith: “[a]fter all, there is
not a world of difference exists between the objective requisite of
good faith and that of the reasonable expectations of the parties.”84

IV.GOOD FAITH IN INTERNATIONAL LAW
The international public law we were taught in our youth reflected
the observation of Machiavelli, who wrote in 1513 that every prince
of our time preaches peace and good faith but respects neither.85
More specifically, Romain Yakemtochouk indicates that
“international practice also demonstrates that the supposed good faith
on the part of states is a great myth since there is no angelic practice
in international politics.”86
International public law arose from the exercise of power of
82. Philippe Kahn, Les principes généraux du droit devant les arbitres du
commerce international [English translation], 116 J. DROIT INT’L 305, 308 (1989).
83. Farnsworth, supra note 67, at 63.
84. Steyn, supra note 64, at 439.
85. NICCOLÒ MACHIAVELLI, THE PRINCE 55 (David Wootton ed., trans., Hacket
Publ’g Co. 1995) (discussing that if the ruler were to show respect for good faith or
peace, their reign would end).
86. See François Xavier Saluden, La Bonne Foi: Approche objective du
concept de bonne foi et de sa normativite [Good Faith: An Approach to the
Concept of Objective Good Faith and Its Normativity] 5 (citing Romain
YakemtchoukYAKEMTOCHOUK, R., La bonne fois dans le pratique coutumière
des États, at p. 7, available at http://edi.univ-paris1.fr/travaux/06SaludenBF.pdf.
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sovereign States. Therefore, the introduction of good faith into
international law, and more specifically in international public law, is
a very recent phenomenon.87 The U.N. Charter indicates that “[a]ll
Members, in order to ensure to all of them the rights and benefits
resulting from membership, shall fulfill in good faith the obligations
assumed by them in accordance with the present Charter.”88 In
furtherance of this, in 1970, the U.N. General Assembly adopted the
Declaration of the Principles of International Law on Amicable
Relations and Cooperation among States: “[e]very state has the duty
to fulfill in good faith its obligations under international agreements
valid under the generally recognized principles and rules of
international law.”89
Basic texts have helped solidify the general principle of good faith
in international law.90 Article 38.1.c of the Statute of the International
Court of Justice (ICJ) establishes that “the general principles of law
recognized by civilized nations” constitutes one of the sources of
international law which must be applied by the Court.91 Professor
Georg Schwarzenberger points out with good reason, in the prologue
to Bin Cheng’s book on the general principles of law that the drafters
of the Statute of the International Court of Justice launched (perhaps
without realizing the consequences) “a challenge to the Doctrine of
87. See William W. Burke-White & Andreas von Staden, Investment
Protection in Extraordinary Times: The Interpretation and Application of NonPrecluded Measures Provisions in Bilateral Investment Treaties, 48 VA. J. INT’L L.
307, 378 (2008) (“While good faith has long been a core principle of international
law, a workable standard of good faith review has yet to be fully developed.”)
88. U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 2.
89. Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly
Relations and Co-operation Among States in Accordance with the Charter of the
United Nations, G.A. Res. 2625 (XXV), U.N. GAOR, 25th Sess., Supp. No. 18,
U.N. Doc. A/8018, at 124 (Oct. 24, 1970).
90. See Judge Mohammed Bedjaoui, Keynote Address at the Conference on
Good Faith, International Law, and Elimination of Nuclear Weapons 18 (Linda
Asher & Peter Weiss trans., May 1, 2008), available at http://lcnp.org/
disarmament/2008May01eventBedjaoui.pdf (“Good faith is a fundamental
principle of international law, without which all international law would
collapse.”).
91. Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 38.1, June 26, 1945, 59
Stat. 1055, 33 U.N.T.S. 993 (“The Court, whose function is to decide pursuant to
international law such disputes as are submitted to it, shall apply . . . the general
principles of law recognized by civilized nations . . . .”).
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International Law to sail into new and unchartered seas.”92
The principle of good faith, from that time, constitutes a source of
international law which must be taken into consideration in decisions
of the ICJ and, in general, by the public and private protagonists of
international law. It is therefore no surprise that the ICJ stated in the
Nuclear Tests Case that “[o]ne of the basic principles governing the
creation and performance of legal obligations, whatever their source,
is the principle of good faith.”93 Nonetheless, the ICJ’s jurisprudence
has fluctuated in this regard since in 1988, in the Border and
Transborder Armed Actions case between Nicaragua and Honduras,
it elaborated that good faith, as a concept, “is not in itself a source of
obligation.”94
Article 31, paragraph 1, of the Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties95 establishes that “[a] treaty shall be interpreted in good
faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the
terms of the treaty in their context and in light of its object and
purpose.”96 Logically, it also applies to treaties regulating
international arbitration involving commercial and investment
protection.97 Its preamble is interesting, noting “the principles of
free consent and of good faith and the pacta sunt servanda rule are
universally recognized.”98 Consequently, arbitral tribunals are
interpreting treaties by extrapolating the logical consequences of
this reference to the principle of good faith.99 Among many other
92. See BIN CHENG, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF LAW AS APPLIED BY
INTERNATIONAL COURTS AND TRIBUNALS xi (1953); see also GEORG
SCHWARZENBERGER, THE FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, 290–
326 (1955).
93. Nuclear Tests Case (Austl. v. Fr.), 1974 I.C.J. 253, 268 (Dec. 20).
94. Border and Transborder Armed Actions (Nicar. v. Hond.), Judgment, 1988
I.C.J. 69, 105 (Dec. 20).
95. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 31.1, May 23, 1969, 1155
U.N.T.S. 331.
96. Id. art. 31.1.
97. See id. art. 1 (asserting that the Vienna Convention applies to treaties
between States); id. art 2.1(a) (defining “treaty” as “an international agreement
concluded between States in written form and governed by international law,
whether embodied in a single instrument or in two or more related instruments and
whatever its particular designation).
98. Id. pmbl.
99. See Thomas W. Wälde, “Equality of Arms” in Investment Arbitration:
Procedural Challenges, in ARBITRATION UNDER INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT
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examples, one may cite the arbitral award between Técnicas
Medioambientales Tecmed, S.A. and the Republic of Mexico: “[t]he
Arbitral Tribunal considers that this provision of the Agreement, in
light of the good faith principle established by international law,
requires the Contracting Parties to provide to international
investments treatment that does not affect the basic expectations that
were taken into account by the foreign investor to make the
investment.”100
The U.N. Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of
Goods also speaks of the principle of good faith: “[i]n the
interpretation of this Convention, regard is to be had to its
international character and to the need to promote uniformity in its
application and the observance of good faith in international
trade.”101 The commentary emphasizes the nature of the compromise
which resolved the differences between Anglo-Saxon and
Continental jurists regarding good faith. The sale and purchase need
not be governed by good faith, but rather the observance of good
faith in international commerce must be ensured. The minutes of the
deliberations on this delicate subject matter reflect the compromise
between the representatives of countries that sought a general rule on
good faith as applicable to contracts, and those that did not accept
this position because it would introduce a factor of uncertainty, of
undeniable risks in the judicial or arbitration proceeding.102
Another very different but clear position is that reflected in the
UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial Contracts.
Article 1.7, states that “[e]ach party must act in accordance with
good faith and fair dealing in international trade. The parties may not
AGREEMENTS 161, 161 n.1 (Katia Yannaca-Small ed., 2010).
100. Tecnicas Medioambientales Tecmed S.A. v. United Mexican States, ICSID
Case No. ARB(AF)/00/2, Award, ¶ 154, (May 29, 2003).
101. U.N. Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, supra
note 67, art. 7(1).
102. See Alexander S. Komarov, Internationality, Uniformity and Observance of
Good Faith as Criteria in Interpretation of CISG: Some Remarks on Article 7(1),
25 J.L. & COM. 75, 83 (2005); cf. Ulrich Magnus, Comparative Editorial Remarks
on the Provisions Regarding good Faith in CISG Article 7(1) and the UNIDROIT
Principles Article 1.7, in AN INTERNATIONAL APPROACH TO THE INTERPRETATION
OF THE UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON CONTRACTS FOR THE INTERNATIONAL
SALE OF GOODS (1980) AS UNIFORM SALES LAW 45 (John Felemegas ed., 2007).
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exclude or limit this duty.”103 Article 2.1.15, goes on to further
indicates that “[a] party is free to negotiate and is not liable for
failure to reach an agreement. However, a party who negotiates or
breaks off negotiations in bad faith is liable for the losses caused to
the other party. It is bad faith, in particular, for a party to enter into or
continue negotiations when intending not to reach an agreement with
the other party.”104
In concluding with this reference to basic texts that mention the
general principle of good faith from the perspective of international
law, we cannot overlook the Understanding on Rules and Procedures
Governing Dispute Settlement of the World Trade Organization.
Article 3.10, mentions that “[i]t is understood that requests for
conciliation and the use of the dispute settlement procedures should
not be intended or considered as contentious acts and that, if a
dispute arises, all Members will engage in these procedures in good
faith in an effort to resolve the dispute.”105

V. GOOD FAITH IN INTERNATIONAL
ARBITRATION
We have already highlighted the challenge presented to the
international jurist following the ICJ Statute. The general principles
are the source of law and, as such, must serve not only to inform
international legal relations, but also, in a contentious phase, may be
the direct basis for claims. The same applies in international
commercial arbitration and, naturally, in investment protection,
which sits between international public law and private law.
Goldman, in studying lex mercatoria, distinguished the general
principles of law recognized by civilized nations for the purposes of
article 38 of the ICJ Statute from the uses and practices of
international commerce. From the era in which maestro Goldman
103. INT’L INST. FOR THE UNIFICATION OF PRIVATE LAW [UNIDROIT],
PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL CONTRACTS art. 1.7 (2010),
available at http://www.unidroit.org/english/principles/contracts/principles2010/
translations/blackletter2010-main.htm.
104. Id. art. 2.1.15.
105. Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of
Disputes art. 3.10, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World
Trade Organization, Annex 2, 1869 U.N.T.S. 401.
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analyzed the lex mercatoria up to the present, few years, albeit
extraordinarily intense ones in the area of international arbitration,
have passed.106 The generalization of investment protection
arbitration has leaped across the borders of public and private in
international law. Arbitration arising from bilateral or multilateral
treaties has eliminated the distinction between the public and private,
including the area of general principles of law. In the words of
Goldman, good faith continues to be the essence of the lex
mercatoria but it is also found in the core of investment protection
arbitration.
According to Kahn, the essential contribution of the Norsolor
judgment is “having directly connected liability to a general principle
of transnational law.”107 Such direct connection of an arbitration
decision to general principles of law also permeates in the judicial
phase in decisions seeking assistance with or oversight of arbitration
rulings. The Swiss Federal Tribunal, in a case brought by the United
Arab Emirates against Westland Helicopters Ltd., a British company,
upheld that the oversight exercised in Switzerland over an award
should be carried out on the basis of transnational or universal public
policy which includes “the fundamental principles of law imposed
without any consideration of the ties of a litigation to a given
country.”108
The link of arbitration to the general principles of law appears
clearly and categorically in investment protection. Suffice it to recall
106. See generally Berthold Goldman, La lex mercatoria dans les contrats et
l’arbitrage internationaux: réalité et perspectives [English translation], CLUNET
475 (1979); see also Berthold Goldman, Cour de cassation, 1re Chambre civile, 9
octobre 1984, société Pabalk Ticaret Sirketi c/ société Norscolor, 1 REVUE
L’ARBITRAGE 431 (1985).
107. Kahn, supra note 82, at 321 (“Et l’apport essentiel de la sentence Norsolor
est d’avoir directement rattaché la responsabilité à un principe général de droit
transnational.”).
108. Bundesgericht [BGer] [Federal Supreme Court] Apr. 19, 1994, 120
ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES SCHWIZERISCHEN BUNDESGERICHTS [BGE] II 155, 168
(Switz.) (“[S]oit le choix d’un ordre public transnational ou universel incluant ‘les
principes fondamentaux du droit qui s’imposent sans égard aux biens du litige avec
un pays déterminé’”); see Emmanuel Gaillard, John E.C. Brierley Commemorative
Address: L’ordre juridique arbitral: réalité, utilité et spécificité [The Arbitral Law:
Reality, Utility and Specificity ] (Sept. 24, 2009), in 55 REVUE DROIT MCGILL
891, 903–04 (2010).
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that article 42, paragraph 1, of the Washington Convention
establishes that “[i]n the absence of such agreement, the Tribunal
shall apply the law of the Contracting State party to the dispute
(including its rules on the conflict of laws) and such rules of
international law as may be applicable.”109 Consequently, the
arbitrator’s conduct in an ICSID proceeding is linked to the rules or
principles of international law.
The principle of good faith has governed the arbitrator’s conduct
in investment protection matters since its inception. An example of
this is found in the Lanco arbitration against Argentina referred to
earlier.110 The arbitration tribunal in Inceysa Vallisoletana S.L. v.
Republic of El Salvador also clearly expressed itself in this respect:
“[g]ood faith is a supreme principle, which governs legal relations in
all of their aspects and content.”111 Thus, arbitration jurisprudence
has repeatedly held that good faith acceptance by the investor is not
possible if there were corruption, money-laundering or fraud in
making the investment; the investment would be precluded by the
principle of good faith.
When an arbitrator decides on specific claims based on a
legislative text he enjoys an interpretative precision that he lacks
when basing his decisions on the general principles of law,
specifically on the principle of good faith. Therefore, the logical
hesitation that exists in practice and in doctrine makes recurring to
good faith replete with legal insecurity or, in a worst case scenario,
leads to a risk of arbitrariness. Franz Wieacker expressed himself in
those terms,112 as did the drafter of the Egyptian code, Abdel-Razzak
109. Observe that the official translations are not a faithful reflection of what
was agreed. Compare Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes
Between States and Nationals of Other States, art. 42(1), Mar. 18, 1965, 575
U.N.T.S. 160 (stating, in English, “such rules of international law as may be
applicable”), with Convenio Sobre Arreglo de Diferencias Relativas a Inversiones
Entre Estados y Nacionales de Otros Estados art. 42(1), Mar. 18, 1965, 575
U.N.T.S 206 (stating, in Spanish, “normas de derecho internacional”), and
Convention pour le Reglement des Differends Relatifs aux Investissements entre
Etats et Ressortissants d’Autres Etats art. 42, Mar. 18, 1965, 575 U.N.T.S. 161
(stating, in French, “ainsi que les principes de droit internacional en la matière”).
110. See supra notes 22-25 and accompanying text.
111. Inceysa Vallisoletana S.L. v. Republic of El Salvador, ICSID Case No.
ARB/03/26, Award, ¶ 230 (Aug. 2, 2006), 28 ICSID Rep. 311 (2008).
112. See FRANZ WIEACKER, EL PRINCIPIO GENERAL DE LA BUENA FE [THE
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al-Sanhuri.113 Nevertheless, any judicial or arbitral decision, as a
human activity, has a strong discretionary content subject to personal
valuation. Therefore, arbitrators are extraordinarily cautious in their
decisions when they must apply the principle of good faith.
Specifically, arbitrators are well aware of the risk of subsequent
judicial oversight or oversight by a special tribunal of annulment.114
However, it is clear that the application of the general principles of
law in international arbitration does not open the door to
arbitrariness. Good faith is exercised in the contractual negotiation
and in the subsequent performance of the contract. If a dispute arises
from the legal relationship, there is no doubt that arguments based on
good faith are of a more precarious nature than others and thus, the
need for a greater conviction at first and the need for a more exact
reasoning by the arbitrator in his decision-making process
afterwards.

VI.THE REQUIREMENTS FOR ARBITRATING IN
GOOD FAITH
Just as with any contract, the negotiation and performance of the
GENERAL PRINCIPLE OF GOOD FAITH] 30 (Jose Luis Carro trans., 1982) ((“[S]e ha
querido encontrar en las cláusulas generales una válvula para las exigencias éticosociales, una especie de ilustrado positivismo social que en cierto modo inhala
como por diósmosis una fresca ética social de primera mano . . . Se teme que se
produzca una debilitación del Derecho a través de una laxa y hasta demagógica
equidad y se ve en las cláusulas generales una puerta abierta a la arbitrariedad . . . .
”).
113. See Al-Sanhoury, Le Standard juridique, in RECUEIL D’ETUDES SUR LES
SOURCES DU DROIT EN L’HONNEUR DE FRANÇOIS GENY (VOL. II : LES SOURCES
GENERALES DES SYSTEMES JURIDIQUES ACTUELS) 144, 155 (Librairie du Recueil
Sirey ed., 1934) (“…en donnant au juge le pouvoir discrétionnaire nécessaire pour
l’application du standard, on risque de tomber dans l’arbitraire ; le juge donnerait
libre essor à ses tendances personnelles, et appliquerait ses propres doctrines
sociale et économiques. ”). See generally STEFAN GRUNDMANN & DENIS
MAZEAUD, GENERAL CLAUSES AND STANDARDS IN EUROPEAN CONTRACT LAW
(Stefan Grundmann & Denis Mazeaud eds., 2006).
114. Accord José E. Alvarez & Kathryn Khamsi, The Argentine Crisis and
Foreign Investors, in YEARBOOK ON INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW & POLICY
379, 426 (Karl P. Sauvant ed., 2009) (“Given the uncertainties about what
precisely is meant by a standard of only ‘good faith’ review, arbitrators who opt
for it without explicit textual warrant are in uncharted waters and might be
accused, as by a subsequent ICSID annulment body of exceeding their legal
mandate.”).

2012]

GOOD FAITH IN INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION

787

arbitration agreement must be governed by the principle of good
faith. This principle affects both the parties to the dispute as well as
the arbitrators or arbitration institutions or, in general, any person
participating in the arbitral proceeding, whether as an attorney or an
expert.
In the Methanex v. United States arbitration, “[i]n the Tribunal’s
view, the Disputing Parties each owed in this arbitration a general
legal duty to the other and to the Tribunal to conduct themselves in
good faith during these arbitration proceedings and to respect the
equality of arms between them, the principles of ‘equal treatment’
and procedural fairness.”115
The duty to arbitrate in good faith is infringed upon when
improper pressure is applied to the arbitrators, when illegally
obtained evidence is used, when the principle non venire contra
factum propium is violated, when anti-suit injunctions are abused,
when the arbitrators are challenged for the sole purpose of obtaining
a delay or when the proceeding is delayed as a consequence of the
refusal to pay the arbitration costs and expenses.116 In turn, arbitrators
and arbitration institutions must fulfill their role in good faith,
protecting the integrity of the proceeding. Dedication, diligence and
celerity in the procedural phases as well as the sound management of
the proceeding are obligations that derive from the good faith of the
performance of arbitration commitments.
A great deal is said about arbitrators or experts at lectures and
congresses. Oftentimes, the specific professional obligations of
attorneys in the area of arbitration are not taken into consideration.
The attorney’s ethics and his professional responsibilities are the
same when he acts in consultations, in judicial proceedings or in
arbitration. Nevertheless, many arbitration proceedings are brought
for the sole purpose of negotiation. The deadlines required by mutual
agreement by the parties’ counsel to the tribunal are frequently
excessive. Discovery battles at times deadlock the development of
115. Methanex Corp. v. United States, Final Award of the Tribunal on
Jurisdiction and Merits, ¶ 54 (NAFTA Ch. 11 Trib. Aug. 3, 2005), available at
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/51052.pdf.
116. See generally Julie Bédard et al., Arbitrating in Good Faith and Protecting
the Integrity of the Arbitral Process, 2010 PARIS J. OF INT’L ARB. 737 (2010).
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the proceeding. Experts, and especially so-called legal experts, are
abused. Documentation submitted is frequently superfluous.
Excessively costly hearings are requested which are a true waste of
time, if the submissions to the tribunal had been prepared
appropriately.

VII. CONCLUSION
The fact that the principle of good faith appears in one form or
another in the majority of arbitral awards is clear evidence of its
importance in international arbitration; the Norsolor case went so far
as to link the specific arbitration award to general principles of law.
In many arbitration awards, the general principles of law and,
specifically, of good faith, are not only guides, but rather the specific
basis for the claims. In investment protection arbitration good faith
already appears in the jurisdictional phase in that the investor’s
individual acceptance presupposes good faith without which the
arbitration agreement does not exist. The content of good faith tends
to depend on the legal tradition involved. The Anglo-Saxon rejection
of the principle of good faith has, in practice, been mitigated by legal
modifications recently introduced into U.S. law or by osmosis in
English law as a consequence of joining the European Union. The
selection of arbitrators constitutes one of the fundamental elements
for success in the arbitration strategy. The legal culture and training
potential arbitrators receive must be taken into consideration at the
time of their appointment, anticipating the impact these factors have
on the ultimate decision-making process. The arbitrators’
professionalism and their frequent decisions pursuant to laws that are
foreign to them minimizes, but does not exclude, the risks of a
mistaken appointment. The globalization of the economy and the
development of investment protection arbitration have erased that
fine line between international public law and private law. The
general principles of law recognized in the civilized nations to which
article 38 of the Statute of the ICJ alludes to, also have their legal
efficacy in the areas of commerce or international investment.
Arbitration presupposes trust between the parties and the arbitrators
or other actors in international transactions. A professional solution
to dispute is sought because it is assumed that the legal relations have
arisen in good faith, and the parties trust in the good faith of the
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arbitrators and, unless expressly excluded, assume that they will take
into consideration in their decision, apart from other normative or
procedural elements, the general principle of law of good faith.

